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The Duty of Corporate
Directors to Pay Dividends
BY RANDALL K. JUsTICE'
I. INTRODUCTION
irectors have a great deal of power in the corporate world.
However, they also have clearly defined obligations. One of
these obligations is to pay shareholders dividends on their
investments.I In determining when dividends should be paid, the directors
must look at the financial state of the corporation, the expectations of the
shareholders, and the requirements for fulfilling their fiduciary duties.
This Note will examine the recent dividend policies of American
corporations and how the business judgment rule has been used by courts
to give directors discretion in determining when to pay dividends. Part II
of this Note will deal with shareholder expectations.2 This Part will include
an analysis of the recent trends in the payment of dividends by the largest
corporations. Part III will discuss the application of the business judgment
rule and the intrinsic fairness test to a board of directors' decision regarding
distributions to shareholders.3 This Part will examine the circumstances
*J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
Rutherford B Campbell, Jr., Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky, for his assistance in selecting a topic for this Note.
'The term "dividend" has slightly different meanings depending on the context
in which it is used. For example, the Internal Revenue Code defines a dividend as
"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders - (1) out of
its earnings and profits accumulated." I.RC. § 316(a) (1998). This is an expansive
definition which is much broader than many individuals would use to define
dividend. Most investors and members of the general public consider dividends
cash payments made, pro rata, to the shareholders of a corporation. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 478 (6th ed. 1990). For the purposes of this Note, the general
public's definition of dividend will be used.
2 See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 21-148 and accompanying text.
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surrounding cases where directors have been absolved from liability for
their decisions, including the most notable case, Dodge v. FordMotor Co.,4
where a shareholder was successful in compelling the directors of a
corporation to pay dividends. Part IV will analyze two special issues
dealing with suits to compel the payment of dividends.' These issues are
whether the suit should be brought as a derivative action against the
corporate directors or as an individual action against the corporation6 and
the special problems associated with a closely held corporation.7 Part V
will explain why the courts have taken the correct approach in actions
against directors to compel the payment of dividends.
II. SHAREHOLDER EXPECTATIONS
Investors purchase stock to obtain a "return on their investment," which
"is measuredbyboth dividends and appreciation in share value overtime."'
"The shareholders forming an ordinary business corporation expect to
obtain the profits of their investment in the form of regular dividends." 9 In
the early 1990s, many corporations slowed the rate of growth of their
dividends or stopped paying dividends completely."
This trend continued through the early part of 1996, when dividend
payments were at "'lows not seen for the last 100 years.' ' ' As the
' Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
5 See infra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
'Arthur Neis, The Director as Fiduciary, FIN. EXECUTIvE, July-Aug. 1997, at
49.
'Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (quoting 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 447, at 421 (2d ed. 1886)).
10 For example, during the first nine months of 1995, dividend payments of
Standard & Poor's ("S&P") corporations only rose 4.1% overthe prior year, which
was below expectations. In addition, 59 S&P corporations had not declared a
dividend, compared to 53 the year before. See Shirley A. Lazo, Profits are Hot,
Dividends Not: Investors Would Rather Have Future Gains, BARRON'S, Oct. 9,
1995, at 30, 30. The Standard & Poor's 500 is "an unmanaged benchmark of
common stock performance consisting of 500 of the largest U.S. publicly traded
companies." Kenneth H. Rosenbaum, Plan to Retire Independently Wealthy, CHI.
BAR Ass'N REC., Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 44, 46.
" Chris Gessel, Investors Corner: Dividends Creeping Up From Historic Lows,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, June 14, 1996, at A1 (quoting Marshall Acuff of Smith
Barney Inc.), available in 1996 WL 10195750.
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economy and corporate earnings improved, corporations began paying
larger dividends. 2 Almost half of the companies on the Standard & Poor's
500 raised the amount of dividends they paid in May 1996. 1 This "was the
biggest one-month batch of dividend increases since January 1981 .""
Although the overall amounts of dividends have increased, minority
shareholders in closely held and family-owned corporations are in many
instances refused dividends by the corporate directors.15 This occurs
because of the nature of the ownership interest and the position of control
in the corporation that majority shareholders often hold. The majority
shareholders in these types of corporations are normally directors who can
appoint themselves as the chief officers of the corporation and then set high
salaries for themselves in order to avoid double taxation of the income they
receive. If this income were in the form of dividends instead of executive
compensation, it would face taxation "at both the corporate and individual
level.""6 The directors then do not declare dividends because they have
already received income from the corporation.
This system works well for the shareholders who also hold positions
in the business, but leaves out the minority shareholders who depend on
dividends as the only form of return on their investment. This practice can
also be used to force minority shareholders to sell their stock to the
majority at prices significantly below the stock's book value.1 7 These sales
do give the former minority shareholders some return on their investment,
but they take away the future economic benefits of stock ownership as well
as the control over the company which stock ownership provides. Although
many investors do nothing about these practices, there has been a
significant increase in the number of complaints filed by minority
shareholders against majority shareholders for the payment of dividends. 8
12 See id.
'3 See id.
14 Td.
's See Barbara Marsh, Minority Shareholders Stand Up, Demand to be Heard:
Rights Movement Is Gaining Better Terms from Closely Held Companies, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 1993, at B2.
16 Id.
7 See id. (explaining that the shares are sold below book value because they
lack marketability).
8 "Requests for help from minority shareholders in closely held corporations
have risen to several a month from one a year in the last two years.. . ." Id. (citing
information provided by the United Shareholders Association, a Washington
advocacy group).
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The question is, how can the investors make sure they continue
receiving dividends? The traditional answer was by their choice of
directors. The idea was that "[w]hen shareholders elect directors as their
representatives, the directors' objective should be the highest possible
return for those they represent."19 However, the courts' application of the
business judgment rule has severely limited the ability of shareholders to
compel the payment of dividends.2"
Il. SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS TO COMPEL DIVIDENDS
The courts in several states have taken the lead in litigating issues
relating to corporate dividend policy. These courts have used virtually the
same standards to judge director action-the business judgment rule and
the intrinsic fairness test. When the business judgment standard is
applied,
the court will examine the decision only to the extent necessary to verify
the presence of a business decision, disinterestedness and independence,
due care, good faith, and the absence of an abuse of discretion. If these
elements are present-and they are presumed to be present-and the case
does not involve fraud, illegality, ultra vires conduct or waste, then the
court will not second guess the merits of the decision.21
This places the burden of proof on the plaintiff in an action to show that
application of the business judgment standard is inappropriate.
When the plaintiff is successful in shifting the burden of proof to the
directors, the intrinsic fairness standard is applied by the courts. This
standard requires that the directors prove the price set for payments of
dividends was fair and they dealt fairly with the shareholders in making the
decision regarding whether dividends should be paid.'
'9 Neis, supra note 8, at 49.
20 See infra notes 28-131 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the
business judgment rule, see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
2 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ETAL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3 (4th ed. 1993) (footnote omitted). Ultra vires is
defined as "[a]cts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as defined by
its charter or laws of state of incorporation." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1522 (6th
ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
22 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-14 (Del. 1983);
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del. 1971).
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Another common factor in cases regarding dividend policy is the use
of derivative actions.'
A shareholder derivative action is a lawsuit brought by one or more
minority shareholders in order "to enforce a corporate cause of action
against officers, directors, and third parties." The shareholder "asserts on
behalf of [the] corporation a claim belonging not to the shareholder, but
to the corporation," in order to remedy an alleged wrong to the
corporation "[w]hen the corporate cause of action is for some reason not
asserted by the corporation itself."24
This form of action allows individual shareholders to go forward with a
claim even though they may not have the right to go forward with an
individual cause of action. The application of these factors by courts in
different jurisdictions is shown by the following cases.
A. Revised Model Business Corporation Act States
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") section
8.30 sets forth the generally accepted duties of a director." These duties
include acting in good faith, exercising due care, and acting loyally.26 These
standards of conduct determine how a director's actions will be judged.
"[T]he manner in which the director performs his duties, not the
correctness of his decisions" will determine if the director has breached
these duties.27 Thus, directors are given a great deal of discretion in making
corporate decisions. These decisions determine if the corporation pays
dividends, buys new machinery, or takes any other actions. The potential
for an abuse of this power by a given director or board of directors
therefore obviously exists. These potentials for abuse, along with the
importance of decisions the directors make, are reasons to allow
shareholders to question the decisions of directors in civil actions.
Making a decision as to when to declare and pay dividends is one of the
functions of the corporation's board of directors.28 The language of the
' See, e.g., Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40 (Del. Ch. 1937); Cashman v. Petrie,
201 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1964).24 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 21, at 709 (footnotes omitted).
25 See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 official cmt. (1984).
26 See id.
27 Id.
' See id. § 6.40.
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RMBCA does not require a board to declare dividends, but gives the board
the discretion to declare dividends when the financial condition of the
corporation would not be adversely affected. 29 This decision, however,
should be made only after determining what is required to satisfy the
obligations which directors have to shareholders.
The Kentucky Business Corporation Act3" follows the RiMBCA's
treatment of dividend payment.31 The directors of Kentucky corporations
owe the corporation and its shareholders the duties of good faith, due care,
and loyalty. 2 The Kentucky courts have determined that the "[u]ndivided
profits of a corporation in a sense or qualifiedly belong to the stockholders,
but disposition or distribution thereof rests within the fair discretion of the
directors."33 If the directors do not breach their fiduciary duties, they will
not be forced to declare dividends.
The business judgment rule prevents a director who has not acted
improperly from facing liability for the acts of the board of directors.34
"Under the rule, courts will not second-guess a business decision, so long
as corporate management exercised a minimum level of care in arriving at
the decision."35 This rule "protects a board's decision regarding payment
of a dividend or the making of a dishribution.... unless withholding the
distribution is explicable only on the theory of an oppressive or fraudulent
abuse of discretion."'36 Therefore, as long as the directors have used their
knowledge of the corporation and their judgment as to what would be best
for the corporation, the courts will not second-guess their decisions.37 This
principle is applied almost uniformly in states with a developed corporate
law, such as Delaware 8 and New York. 9
29 See id. § 6.40(c).
30 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 271B (Banks-Baldwin 1989).
"1 Compare id. § 271B.6-400 with REV. MODELBUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1984).32 See K.R.S. § 271B.8-300.
33Taylorv. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 173 S.W.2d-377, 380 (Ky. 1943) (citing
Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 179 S.W. 205 (Ky. 1915)).
' See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 377 (7th Cir.
1984) (applying the Illinois business judgment rule to an action for breach of
directors' fiduciary duties).
35 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994) (footnote omitted).
36 11 id. § 1041.20 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995) (footnotes omitted); see also id.
§ 5325.
37 See, e.g., Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387, 390 (S.D. Me.
1951) (explaining that the directors' decision will normally control, unless the
directors acted improperly).
3 See infra notes 40-81 and accompanying text.
39See infra notes 82-131 and accompanying text.
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B. Delaware
The Delaware General Corporate Law states that "Itihe directors of
every corporation, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of
incorporation, may declare and pay dividends upon the shares of its capital
stock."' "There is no statutory requirement to pay any dividend."' This
broad discretion given to directors allows them to determine when, and if,
dividends will be paid in a given year. The shareholders do not have any
statutory rights that can be enforced in court. The only way a shareholder
can force the payment of dividends is by showing an abuse of discretion or
fraud by the board of directors.42
In Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,43 a shareholder, John Baron,
attempted "to have the 1973 election of directors declared illegal and
invalid." The owners of preferred stock in Baron were given the authority
to elect a majority of the board of directors if six or more quarterly
dividend payments were in arrears.4' Baron claimed that the directors had
not paid the accumulated dividend arrearages on the preferred stock, even
though the corporation possessed sufficient surplus funds to pay these
arrearages.4 By not paying the dividends due the preferred shareholders,
the directors would keep their positions on the board. Although Baron did
not expressly challenge the failure of the board to pay dividends, the court
held that the election of directors could not be addressed without
addressing the dividend arrearages issue.47
The court in Baron examined the decision of the board not to declare
dividends and found that the board of directors in a Delaware corporation
has a great deal of discretion in declaring dividends. The decision of the
board will not be disturbed unless the directors have breached their
fiduciary duties.48 Either "fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be
40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1991).
41 Paul H. Zalecki, The Corporate Goverance Roles of the Inside and the
Outside Directors, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 831, 844 (1993).
42 See Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984).
43 Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
' Id. at 655. After filing the first action, the shareholder filed a similar action
concerning the 1974 election of directors. Those actions were consolidated and
both were before the court in this case. See id.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 657.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 658-59.
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shown" for the court to find that the duties of the directors have been
breached.49 The court declined to find that preferred dividends in arrears
must be paid as soon as there are sufficient funds to pay them." In
addition, the court held that the recent financial history of the corporation
had to be taken into consideration when determining if the directors had
breached their fiduciary duties. Since Allied had recently suffered poor
financial results, the court refused to find that the directors had acted in bad
faith.5 ' Therefore, the court declined to force the directors to declare
dividends on the preferred stock and turn control of the corporation back
over to the common shareholders .
5 2
However, the court did give the common shareholders some
encouragement, holding that the directors "cannot be permitted indefinitely
to plough back all profits.., so as to avoid full satisfaction of the rights of
the preferred to their dividends and the otherwise normal right of the
common stockholders to elect corporate management."53 If the corporation
continued to have profits, the directors would not be able to retain control
by refusing to pay the preferred dividends. The directors' fiduciary duty
was to pay off the preferred dividend arrearages as soon as prudently
possible.5
Delaware courts have long assertedtheir authority to force the payment
of a dividend.5 However, more than a surplus in the corporate accounts
must be shown to convince the court that a dividend should be compelled.56
In Eshleman v. Keenan,57 the company had retained revenues5 8 The
directors argued that although this suit, a derivative action brought by the
plaintiffs against the directors, was not technically a suit for the payment
of dividends, it would have the same effect. Therefore, the plaintiffs should
be paid their proportional share of the recovery instead of the corporation
being paid the full amount.59 The court examined the company's financial
condition, but refused to allow the directors to reduce their liability by only
paying the plaintiffs instead of paying the corporation.60
491 Id. at 659.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
531 Id. at 660.
' See id.
51 See Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40, 43 (Del. Ch. 1937).
" See id.
57 Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40 (Del. Ch. 1937).
" See id. at 42-43.
59 See id. at 41-42.
60See id. at 44-45.
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Eshleman differed from the typical suit to compel the payment of
dividends because the defendants attempted to have the court declare a
dividend. However, the court looked at the nature of a derivative action and
the general principles of when dividends should be declared and found that
declaring a dividend was not the proper course of action.61 Even though the
directors acted improperly, resulting in a likely breach of their fiduciary
duties, the court determined that the recovery was the property of the
corporation. This recovery could be paid out as dividends, but did not have
to be paid to the shareholders.62
The Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed its position on whether to
compel dividend payment in Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc. In
Gabelli, the Liggett Group ("Liggett") was the target of a tender offer by
Grand Metropolitan Limited's ("Grand Met") subsidiary, GM Sub
Corporation ("GM Sub").' After an increase in the tender amount, the
board of directors of Liggett recommended the acceptance of the offer by
the shareholders. GM Sub announced that it or another subsidiary of Grand
Met would merge with Liggett and all shares of Liggett not tendered would
be repurchased at the same price as the tender offer.6 The plaintiffs held
their shares until the merger, expecting to receive the normal quarterly
dividend of $0.625 per share, which they believed had accrued since the
tender offer.66
After Liggett did not declare a dividend for the third quarter, the
plaintiffs filed suit alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of Grand Met as
majority shareholder of Liggett to pay the third quarter dividends .6 This
complaint was dismissed, and an amended complaint was filed which
alleged that Grand Met breached its fiduciary duties by setting the same per
share price for the shares purchased as a result of the tender offer and the
merger and "'without consideration for the dividend which was being
omitted. ' ' 68 The trial court granted Liggett's motion for summary
judgment.69
The Delaware Supreme Court found "this case commenced as, and
continues to be, no more nor less than an action to compel the declaration
61 See id. at 40.
62See id.
P Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 479 A.2d 276 (Del. 1984).
64 See id. at 277-78.
6 See id. at 278.
6 See id.
67 See id. at 279.
68Id. (quoting the amended complaint of Gabelli & Co.).
69See id.
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and payment of a dividend by the Board of Directors of Liggett for the
benefit of about 13% of its stockholders."O7 The court held that Liggett's
board had exercised its business judgment in deciding not to declare a
dividend.7' The court stated that "before the courts will interfere with the
judgment of the board of directors in such matter, fraud or gross abuse of
discretion must be shown.' 7 2 The court did not find any allegation of fraud
or any abuse of discretion on the part of the board. Therefore, the court
refused to compel the directors to declare a dividend.73
The plaintiffs "attempted to avoid the force and effect of the law
governing the declaration of dividends"'74 by asserting that Grand Met's
actions should be evaluated by the intrinsic fairness test.75 Gabelli & Co.,
the minority shareholder that filed the suit, attempted to show that Grand
Met had engaged in self-dealing by taking for itself the dividend to which
the minority shareholders were entitled.76 The court held that Gabelli's
position was "manifestly untenable."77 There was no indication that any
right to a third quarter dividend had been established. Gabelli & Co. could
have tendered its shares after the initial tender offer. Furthermore, the price
was fair, and there was "no valid reason in July to expect extra
compensation for its stock, by dividend or otherwise, over and above that
paid to the great majority of its fellow stockholders in June. '78 Therefore,
the court refused to apply the intrinsic fairness test to Grand Met's
actions.79
This decision properly applied the standards used by Delaware courts.
The plaintiff attempted to gain extra compensation for the stock in the form
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 280 (citing Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749 (Del. 1963)).
73 See id.
74Id.
7 See id. For a description of the intrinsic fairness test, see supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
76 The plaintiff rests its entire case upon the statement in Sinclair (280 A.2d
at 720) that self-dealing ". . . occurs when the parent, by virtue of its
domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that
the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and
detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary."
Id. at 281 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
77 Id.
78 Id.
" See id. The court stated that "Gabelli has demonstrated no such 'self-dealing'
or 'detriment' as to warrant the application of the Sinclair intrinsic fairness test."
Id.
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of dividends. If the court had allowed this to occur, the shareholders who
accepted the initial tender offer would have received less compensation for
the same transaction. This was a case where the plaintiff attempted to
exploit the corporation rather than gain dividends which should have been
paid anyyway.
These cases clearly demonstrate that the Delaware courts place a large
burden on the shareholder who attempts to force the directors of a
corporation to pay dividends. The Delaware statutory and case law both
favor the business judgments of directors over the desires of investors to
achieve a return on their investment in the form of dividends. This
approach, however, is not limited to Delaware. New York"0 and the states
under the RMBCA8' follow the same general approach.
C. New York
The New York Business Corporation Law gives directors authority to
determine when dividends will be paid. 2 The statute states that "[a]
corporation may declare and pay dividends or make other distributions in
cash ... except when currently the corporation is insolvent or would
thereby be made insolvent, or when the declaration... would be contrary
to any restrictions contained in the certificate of incorporation." 3 This
language does not require the directors to declare a dividend, but gives
them the discretion to use their judgment in deciding when a dividend
should be paid.
The New York courts have consistently held shareholders to a high
standard when they have attempted to compel the declaration of
dividends.84 InNechis v. Gramatan Gardens, Inc.,"s the trial court held that
corporate directors must act in good faith and that shareholders must show
fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion to successfully compel a dividend
payment.8 6 Since it found that the amount of the normal dividend declared
by the company was so small, the court considered the plaintiff to be
8oSee infra notes 82-131 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
82 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1986).
831d. § 510(a).
84 See infra notes 80-127.
ssNechis v. Gramatan Gardens, Inc., 231 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
86See id. at 385 (quoting Winter v. Anderson, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 375-76 (App.
Div. 1934)).
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requesting a partial liquidation of the company. 7 As there was no
allegation of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendants.88 This decision demonstrates the
importance placed not only on the form of the pleadings, but also the
importance placed on the potential effect of the desired outcome.
The New York Appellate Division has reached a similar conclusion. In
Cardo v. Safeway Concrete Co., 9 the court stated that "[a]bsent allegations
of fraud, bad faith or dishonesty on the part of the directors, their judgment
in withholding dividends from the stockholders will be regarded as
conclusive."9
The Court of Appeals of New York, the highest court in the state, has
dealt with this subject many times.9' In City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Hewitt Realty Co.,92 the court was faced with a family-owned company in
which six children came to own all the stock. After the death of one of the
children, the decedent's second wife and daughter became income
beneficiaries of a trust made up entirely of his stock in the family
company.93
The company had historically, paid approximately six percent in
dividends annually.94 However, the directors did not pay a dividend after
the death of the testator. The second wife and child claimed that there was
sufficient surplus in the company to pay dividends and that they were being
denied the benefit of the trust because they had no interest in the stock
beyond the right to dividends. 95 The court then determined that "[tihe
plaintiff, to succeed on this appeal, must establish as matter of law that the
action of the directors on this record was inimical to the welfare of the
corporation and all its stockholders."96
The court accepted that it had the power to force a dividend in the
proper situation, but determined that this was not the proper situation
87 See id. at 386 (quoting City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co.,
177 N.E. 309, 310 (N.Y. 1931)).
88 See id.
89Cardo v. Safeway Concrete Co., 422 N.Y.S.2d 442 (App. Div. 1979).
9 I1d. at 443.
9' See infra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
92 City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 177 N.E. 309 (N.Y.
1931).
9' See id. at 310. As income beneficiaries, the second wife and daughter would
be entitled to all income, including dividends, on the trust corpus. See id.
See id.
See id.961Id. at311.
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because only "[b]ad faith, fraud, or other breach of trust are grounds for
equitable relief."97 The court did not find any misconduct on the part of the
directors. It was an accepted corporate policy to pay off the debts of the
company before paying dividends. The plaintiffs knew of this policy and
had agreed that dividends would not be paid while there was debt left
unpaid.98 In finding this policy a proper exercise of the directors' business
judgment, the court stated, "A strong case must be made out to compel the
conclusion that it must divide its profits rather than pay its debts or extend
its authorized business." 99 The court also held that a minority stockholder
"cannot compel the directors to accept his judgment in matters of
discretion."'"
In deciding the case, the fact that the corporation was a family business
was significant to the court.' In a closely held corporation, the
shareholders may face circumstances vastly different from those of a
publicly held corporation. Often, the owners of a close corporation depend
on theirpositions as corporate officers orthe dividends that they receive for
income.0 2 The lack of a market for the stock of a closely held corporation
also serves to limit the choices shareholders have when a majority of the
shareholders turn against them.0 3 "Traditional corporate norms, oriented
as they are toward publicly held corporations, proved unsuitable for close
corporations."'" This has led to changes in the fiduciary duties owed
shareholders in a close corporation.0 5
In Cashman v. Petrie,'0 6 the court dealt with two trusts which,
combined, contained all the stock of McGuire Bros., Inc. The plaintiff
trustee controlled forty-nine percent of the stock, while the defendant
trustee controlled fifty-one percent of the stock. 7 The plaintiffs sought a
"distribution of a larger proportion of the earnings of the corporations by
way of dividends to the stockholders.' ' 8 However, the plaintiffs asserted
97 Id.
98 See id. at 310.
99 1d. at311.
101 "It is a family affair." Id.
'
2 See Robert Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause ofAction for Oppression,
48 Bus. LAW. 699, 702 (1993).
103 See id.
104 Id.
'o
5 See id. at 704; infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
"06Cashman v. Petrie, 201 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1964).
'07 See id. at 24-25.
10 Id. at 25.
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that it was "not a minority stockholders' action to compel the declaration
of increased dividends."'0 9 The court rejected this characterization of the
complaint and used the general rules applying to suits to compel
dividends. 110
After examining the complaint, the court held that there were no
allegations of a breach of fiduciary duties by the defendants."' Therefore,
the complaint was dismissed."' The dissenting judge expressed the
opinion, however, that the complaint had sufficiently alleged conduct
which could be found to be a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties."'
This opinion was based on a prior decision holding "in effect that
allegations that earnings were being accumulated for wrongful reasons
stated a cause of action.""' 4 Although a majority of the court rejected this
argument, it appears that these allegations could show a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties.
Gordon v. Elliman"' dealt with a suit by the stockholders of a
corporation to compel the declaration of a dividend. The trial court ordered
the plaintiffs to deposit funds that would be used to cover the expenses of
the corporation if the suit failed." 6 The case was brought as a derivative
action against the directors of the corporation. The court held that the trial
court could order the shareholders to make this type of deposit." 7 In
determining what rights the shareholders had individually, the court stated
that "[u]nless a dividend has been declared, . . . no portion of the assets of
the corporation has been set aside for stockholders, and no right of action
inheres in them to be paid any part of the corporation's funds."'" 8
A suit to compel dividends is a suit to force the directors to fulfill their
fiduciary duties. This type of case does not normally arise unless there has
been some form of perceived mismanagement on the part of the directors.
"[Directors] have usually sought to monopolize the earnings of the
10 Id.
"0 See id. at 25-26.
' See id. at 25.
"2 See id. at 26.
"3 "I fail to see why [plaintiff's] carefully itemized allegations if proven would
not make out a strong case for a holding that the piling up of reserves was in bad
faith or was an abuse of directors' discretion." Id. at 27 (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting).
", Id. (citing Leibert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 1963)).
", Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954).
116 See id. at 333.
"17 See id. at 340.
"I Id. at 334.
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corporation by excessive salaries or collusive agreements or to manipulate
the value ofthe minority stockholdings in orderto freeze them out."' l 9 This
situation is a clear breach of the director's fiduciary duties and should be
addressed by the courts.
The dissent noted, however, that there are circumstances where a
shareholder would be claiming an individual right. 20 These circumstances
include when there is a contract with the corporation to pay dividends or
when the corporation's articles of incorporation require the directors to
declare a dividend.' Judge Fuld expressed the opinion that actions to
compel dividends are normally rights of the shareholder, not the
corporation.'2 This concept would suggest a more active role by the courts
because of the personal nature of the action. However, the application of
the business judgment rule would negate any perceived benefits of
proceeding against the directors for an individual harm.
The New York courts have not been completely unsympathetic to
shareholders who claimed a corporation's directors had acted improperly.
In Von Au v. Magenheimer,I the plaintiff claimed the directors had
intentionally led her to believe the company was in a poor financial
condition and only small dividends could be expected in the future. 124
Based on these representations, the plaintiff sold her stock to the
defendants at a considerably undervalued price.'2 The court held that the
actions of the directors were serious enough to be considered fraud. 126 In
discussing the duties of the directors, the court stated that "[t]he defendants
at least owed the plaintiff the duty to speak the whole truth, if they spoke
at all."'
1 27
The federal courts have reachedthe same conclusionwhen dealing with
New York corporations. In Levin v. Mississippi River Corp.,128 the court
held that some abuse of discretion or bad faith must be shown before the
"9 Id. at 338.
120 See id. at 341 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
121 See id. (Fuld, J., dissenting).
" "In an exceptional case, the failure to pay a dividend may wrong the corpor-
ation itself, a wrong which might be redressed through a derivative action." Id. at
342 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
" Von Au v. Magenheimer, 110 N.Y.S. 629 (App. Div. 1908).
2 4 See id. at 630.
"21 See id. at 631.
126 See id.
127 
vd." Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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decision of the board of directors will be reversed.12 The mere existence
of surplus funds is not enough to convince a court to compel the payment
of dividends. 3 ' Absent a showing of a breach of the director's fiduciary
duties, a court will not act even if the court considers a change in the
dividend policy to be appropriate. 3 '
D. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.
The leading case compelling the directors of a corporation to pay
dividends is Dodge v. FordMotor Co. 32 In Dodge, the plaintiffwanted the
court to restrain the expansion of Ford Motor Co. and to force a dividend
out of surplus capital held by the company that was to be used for the
expansion and improvement. 3 3 Ford Motor Co. sustained rapid growth
after its incorporation in 1903.13' By July 31, 1916, the company had
approximately $52,000,000 in surplus cash.135 Although the company
regularly paid its quarterly dividend, no special dividend was paid out of
the surplus cash the company had accumulated. 36 The plaintiffs alleged
that this failure to pay a special dividend was caused by a policy of Henry
Ford, a director and principal shareholder, to reinvest the profits into the
company.
137
Ford reportedly believed that since the shareholders had received more
from their investment than they had originally paid, "they were not entitled
to receive anything additional to the regular dividend.., and that it was not
his policy to have larger dividends declared in the future."'' 3 The plaintiffs
wrote to Ford requesting the payment of a special dividend. After they did
129 See id. at 363.
130 See id.
'3' See id. at 364.
132 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
133 See id. at 673.
134 See id. at 669-70.
135 See id. at 670.
'
36 See id. at 671.
137 This declaration of the future policy, it is charged in the bill, was
published in the public press in the city of Detroit and throughout the
United States in substantially the following language: "My ambition,"
declared Mr. Ford, "is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of
this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up
their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of
our profits back into the business."
Id.
138 Id.
[VOL. 87
THE DUTY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
not receive a reply, the plaintiffs filed an action against the company and
the directors. 139
The complaint charged the directors, and specifically Ford, of acting
in a way that denied the shareholders a proper return on their invest-
ment and would harm the shareholders' interest in the company. The
company and the board answered by stating that the planned expansion of
the company in the form of a new production plant and iron smelting
facility, combined with a decrease in the price of the company's cars,
would improve the company's financial position in the long term. In
addition, they stated that the surplus cash was needed for these business
expansions and should not be distributed to the shareholders. 4 Ford also
denied that he was withholding dividends from the shareholders because
he believed they had received all the special dividends they were entitled
to receive.'
4 1
The court determined that the business judgment rule should be applied
to the directors' decision to not pay dividends. -42 The court would not
disrupt the board's decision unless there was bad faith or an abuse of
discretion. 43 All the facts and circumstances were examined in evaluating
the board's actions.'" After looking at the facts in the case, the court held
that the proposed conduct by the board was "not intended to produce
immediately a more profitable business, but a less profitable one.... The
apparent immediate effect will be to diminish the value of shares and the
returns to shareholders."'45 In addition, the court found that Ford's motives
in not declaring a dividend were to deprive the investors of a profit from
their investment. 146 The board's acts were considered "to be not an exercise
of discretion on the part of the directors, but an arbitrary refusal to do what
the circumstances required to be done."' 47 Given these determinations, the
court ordered a special dividend to be declared, but did not interfere with
the expansion of the business.
148
"I See id. at 671-72.
140 See id. at 673-74.
'41 See id. at 675.
142 See id. at 681-82.
'41 See id. at 682 (quoting Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 134
(Mich. 1890)).
" See id. at 681-82.
'
45 Id. at 683.
146 See id. at 683-84.
147 Id. at 683.
141 See id. at 684-85.
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The court's decision in Dodge raises an important issue. The court
looked at statements made by Ford in finding that he intended to withhold
dividends for improper reasons. However, the court also allowed the
business expansion which was one of Ford's major goals. The decision
seems to look more at the company's enormous amount of cash surplus
instead of the business reasons for the decision not to pay dividends, which
is what the business judgement rule requires. This principle of looking at
all of the relevant circumstances also plays an important role in
determining what type of action to bring.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Derivative Action or Individual Action
An important consideration for a minority shareholder planning to
bring a suit compelling payment of dividends is whether the case should be
brought as a derivative action or an individual action. This decision will in
large part depend on the jurisdiction in which the claim will be brought.
However, other factors such as the ability to obtain jurisdiction over all the
directors and the nature of the company can play an important role in this
determination. As was shown in Eshleman v. Keenan,'49 the Delaware
courts recognize that attempts to compel dividends are for the benefit of the
corporation. In these circumstances, the proper form for these cases is a
derivative suit.1 50 Similarly, the New York courts will allow the
shareholders to bring a derivative action.
5 1
However, this procedure is not followed by all jurisdictions. In
Schuckman v. Rubenstein,'52 the trial court allowed an individual action
even though it eventually dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the court looked at the record and determined that
a majority of the members of the board of directors were not defendants.
The court found that the business judgment standard applied to the
decisions of the board and because the court did not have jurisdiction over
a majority of the board of directors, the court refused to order the payment
of dividends. 5 1 "The court itself can not declare a dividend, its power is
49 Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40 (Del. Ch. 1937).
50 See id. at 43.
151 See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
152 Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947).
'51 See id. at 957-58.
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limited to a judgment in personam against the members of the board."'54
Since a majority of the board members were not defendants and a majority
vote is required to declare dividends, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision.
1 55
A similar decision respecting the use of individual actions by
shareholders was reached in Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co."6 In this
case, a minority shareholder attempted to compel the payment of dividends
in a closely held corporation. 57 However, in denying to compel payment
of dividends, the court observed "[t]hat, in appropriate circumstances, a
minority stockholder may invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to
compel the declaration of dividends.' 58 The court also rejected a
procedural claim of the defendants by determining that "[a] stockholder
suing to compel the corporation to declare a dividend is enforcing a right
common to himself and the other stockholders against the corporation,
rather than a derivative right."'
59
There does not appear to be a clear line between derivative and
individual suits. Both are aimed at compelling the payment of a dividend
from corporate funds and both will force the directors to act in a manner
they have previously rejected if successful. However, the success of a suit
may depend on whether the action is pled in the correct form. Therefore,
special care must be taken to determine which type of action is required in
each jurisdiction.
B. Closely Held Corporations
The circumstances surrounding closely held corporations are much
different than those of publicly held corporations. 60 The close corporation
is often family-owned, which can cause problems because of the
relationships among the family members. In addition, the directors and
officers in these companies are likely to be the majority shareholders.
These control positions allow the majority to set their own compensation
and determine the dividend policy that will be followed. These factors
'-
4 Id. at 957.
155 See id. at 957-59.
'16 Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1957).
117 See id. at 609-10.
58 Id. at 611.
15 Id. at 612.
161 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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require a higher level of judicial scrutiny over corporate decisions which
will benefit the majority at the expense of the minority.
This higher level ofjudicial scrutiny is shown in Santarelli v. Katz.'61
In Santarelli, the court dealt with a closely held corporation originally
owned by one family. One of the original owners placed part of his stock
in a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. Santarelli filed this suit to force the
other members of the family to pay back excessive compensation and
account for profits from side businesses that profited from the
corporation.'62 After determining which actions by the majority
shareholders harmed the corporation, the court examined the circumstances
and held that the business judgment standard should not be available to the
officers.'63 The most important facts to the court concerned the amount of
control the Katz family had over the affairs of the business. The family
owned between seventy and ninety percent of the stock at all times, and the
board did not set the compensation level until after the complaint was
filed."M This case demonstrates the higher standards that a court applies to
directors of a closely held corporation in a suit by minority shareholders.
One of the more recent developments in the law surrounding closely
held corporations is an Illinois statute expressly allowing the court to force
dividend payment if the directors "have acted, are acting, or will act in a
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent with respect to the
petitioning shareholder."' 65 This statute uses language which is often
associated with the business judgment rule; therefore, the business
judgment rule will probably be the standard used to determine if the
dividends will be compelled or not. However, the statute also explicitly
authorizes the court to make the corporation pay dividends. The courts
likely already possessedthis power, butthe statutory language indicates the
growing importance of this power in situations where a closely held
corporation is involved.
V. CONCLUSION
The shareholders of a corporation have basic expectations when they
invest in a company. These expectations include payment of a reasonable
161 Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959).
'
62 See id. at 764-68.
163 See id. at 768-69. "However, if a stockholder is being unjustly deprived of
dividends that should be his, a court of equity will not permit management to cloak
itself in the immunity of the business judgment rule." Id. at 768.
164 See id.
165 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(a)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
[VOL. 87
THE DuTY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
dividend when there are sufficient funds in the company. The directors of
a corporation have specific duties which they must fulfill. In fulfilling these
duties, the directors must make many determinations as to what is in the
best interest of the corporation. Sometimes the directors' ideas for the
future of the company do not match what the shareholders want. In these
instances, the directors must evaluate all of their options and make the best
decision they can.
When the directors are faced with these choices, they must be free to
make an unpopular choice without the fear of the shareholders being able
to hold them liable for their actions. If directors faced financial liability for
every decision they made, they would be more likely to reject changes
which could be beneficial for the company in the future. This could
potentially harm the shareholders' interest that the directors are attempting
to protect. The business judgment rule gives directors the latitude they need
to properly make corporate policy in all matters, but especially in
determining when to declare dividends. This is not to say that directors
should never face liability for their decisions. If the directors have abused
their discretion in order to perpetuate their interests or harm minority
shareholders, then they should be accountable for their actions. However,
these types of cases are few and far between.
The most difficult situation for the courts is when a closely held
corporation is involved. In these cases, the competing interests are often
concerned with not only the dividends, but also control of the company.
This can be more difficult in a family-owned corporation because of the
emotional aspects surrounding the company. To resolve these disputes, the
courts must balance all of these factors, while continuing to give the
directors the ability to effectively make decisions. As there are more
attempts to compel dividends in closely held corporations, the courts must
decide if the same standards should apply to directors of publicly traded
companies and closely held companies. As cases such as City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co.'66 and Santarelli6 7 tend to indicate, this is an area
where the courts may be more comfortable in applying a higher level of
scrutiny because of the nature of the corporation and the situation of the
shareholders. In the future, courts should move toward protecting minority
shareholders in these situations by forcing directors to satisfy the intrinsic
fairness test. This is the only way that minority shareholders can be sure
that they will not be taken advantage of by directors who seek to increase
their compensation and freeze out the minority from the benefits and
successes of the corporation.
16 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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